Juveniles\u27 Waiver of Rights:  Legal and Psychological Competence by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 4 
1982 
Juveniles' Waiver of Rights: Legal and Psychological Competence 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Juvenile Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Juveniles' Waiver of Rights: Legal and Psychological Competence, 80 MICH. L. REV. 
820 (1982). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/36 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
820 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 80:817 
JUVENILES' W AIYER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
COMPETENCE. By Thomas Grisso. New York: Plenum Press. 1981. 
Pp. xiii, 295. $32.50. 
Since In re Gault,1 both juveniles who are accused of offenses 
that "may result in commitment to an institution in which . . . 
[their] freedom is curtailed" and their parents "must be notified of 
the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if 
they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to 
represent the child."2 Such juveniles, Gault held, must also be ad-
vised of their fifth amendment right to refuse to answer questions 
posed by legal authorities.3 Although Gault applied only to formal 
delinquency hearings, "almost all post-Gault courts addressing the 
issue concluded that the rights to silence and counsel applied at 
preadjudicatory stages for juveniles just as for adults" (p. 7). Like 
the rights of adult defendants that are protected by Miranda v. Ari-
zona ,4 those guaranteed by Gault may be forfeited if they are "vol-
untarily, knowingly, and intelligently"5 waived. The Miranda 
waiver standard, however, is sometimes difficult to apply to 
juveniles, who may be too immature to satisfy the test. Most courts, 
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
2. 387 U.S. at 41. 
3. 387 U.S. at 55. 
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
5. 384 U.S. at 444. 
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recognizing this problem, look to the "totality of circumstances" 
when assessing the validity of juveniles' waiver of rights. 
Grisso's book, which consists of a series of studies involving dif-
ferent aspects of juveniles' competence to waive their rights, contin-
ues the efforts of some courts6 to examine the extent to which 
waivers may be valid and to discover what considerations are rele-
vant to the "totality of circumstances" test. Several of the studies 
attempted to evaluate the relationships between juveniles' character-
istics and knowledge of their rights. Among the factors that Grisso 
considered are I.Q., race, socioeconomic status, and number of prior 
felony convictions. He finds that age and I.Q. affect juveniles' com-
prehension of their rights most significantly, and concludes that 
these factors should bear heavily on the validity of waivers (p. 203-
04). Judges and juvenile defense lawyers should find studies of this 
sort particularly useful. 
Perhaps the most interesting of Grisso's studies involves the dis-
tinction between juveniles' knowledge of the rights to silence and 
counsel and their understanding of the functions of these rights. 
This distinction is crucial: Unless juveniles understand their rights, 
they cannot "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" waive or as-
sert them (p. 109). To determine whether the rights were under-
stood, Grisso measured juveniles' comprehension of the role of the 
police in interrogation, the function of attorneys, and the significance 
of the right to remain silent. His study reveals that most juveniles do 
not fully comprehend the safeguards that Gault affords them. The 
level of understanding among juveniles, particularly among those 
with an I.Q. below ninety, was significantly lower than among adults 
(p. 128).7 
The juveniles' misunderstandings fell into two main categories. 
Many of the youths had grave misperceptions concerning the role of 
counsel. One third of the juveniles with few or no prior felony refer-
rals believed that attorneys would defend only the innocent. If they 
were guilty, this group believed, their lawyer's role was to aid the 
court in disposing of the case (p. 120). Grisso argues that a waiver of 
the right to counsel by a juvenile who harbored this belief should not 
be valid. He suggests, moreover, that defense attorneys may be able 
to ameliorate this problem partly by informing juveniles about their 
roles before police investigations (p. 129). 
· Juveniles also significantly misunderstood the fifth amendment 
right against self-incrimination. Many of the juveniles whom Grisso 
studied believed, for example, that the police could try to convince 
6. See, e.g., West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968). 
7. One exception to this finding involves juveniles who have been referred for felony 
charges three or more times in the past. These juveniles had a level of understanding equal to 
that of the average adult nonolfender in the study. P. 128. 
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them to waive this right. And a majority believed that the right to 
remain silent was only temporary; the judge, they thought, could 
simply revoke it at will. Waivers made on the basis of this miscon-
ception, Grisso argues, should also not be accepted (p. 129). 
Despite his thorough and extensive research, Grisso's recommen-
dations for solving the problem of invalid waivers are limited. He 
effectively criticizes "traditional" approaches to juvenile reform, but 
presents only two poorly developed alternatives. He suggests first 
that courts should provide a blanket exclusion of confessions or 
mandatory counsel for those juveniles who are least competent to 
waive their rights (p. 202). 8 Grisso acknowledges, as he must, that 
courts have traditionally rejected blanket exclusions, but argues that 
they may be more receptive to his proposal since it involves only a 
specific group of juveniles. He also suggests that judges should use 
his research results to weigh the competence of juveniles to waive 
their rights (p. 203-05). Because judges must deal with individual 
juveniles and not with statistics, however, it is not clear whether 
Grisso's studies will provide substantial assistance. 
Although Juveniles' Waiver of Rights does not present a compre-
hensive proposal for reform, it does off er significant insights to those 
interested in the protection of the rights of juveniles. Grisso's well-
designed studies plainly reveal the incompetence of many juveniles 
to waive their rights and, more importantly, pinpoint specific factors 
that correlate with this incompetence. If judges and advocates take 
his suggestions and use this research to effectuate more rational deci-
sion-making, Grisso's contribution could be immense. 
8. The most vulnerable juveniles were 14 years of age or younger and 15-16 year olds with 
I.Q. scores of 80 or below. P. 202-03. 
